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RECENT DECISIONS
Landlord and Tenant Law: Retaliatory Eviction as a Defense.
In Wisconsin a month-to-month tenancy has long been terminable for
any reason or no reason by either the landlord or the tenant.' The only
legal requirement has been thirty days notice, in writing, prior to the
effective date of termination2 Under this type of law, tenants have been
subjected to retaliatory evictions soon after taking action against the
landlord in an effort to improve their substandard housing conditions.3
In the case of Dickhut v. Norton,4 a tenant who reported housing
code violations to the proper authorities was subsequently given the re-
quired thirty days notice to quit the premises. When the tenant refused,
the landlord brought an unlawful detainer action to evict him. The
tenant's answer denied that he was holding the premises without right.
As a defense, he alleged that the eviction was in retaliation for reporting
housing code violations that existed on the landlord's premises.
After being denied relief in both the County and Circuit Courts of
Milwaukee County, the tenant appealed to the Wisconsin Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court reversed the Circuit Court judgment and
recognized "retaliatory eviction" as a valid defense to unlawful detainer
actions where a retaliatory motive is the "sole" reason for the eviction.5
The decision was based on the legislative public policy expressed in
Wisconsin's Urban Renewal Act6 and the City of Milwaukee's housing
ordinance.7 The constitutional questions raised by the tenant were not
decided by the court3
The two primary contentions of the tenant were expressed as fol-
lows: (1) State court approval of such retaliatory evictions abridged
his constitutional right to make complaints to the housing authorities;
(2) The legislative public policy of Wisconsin would be frustrated if
he were not permitted to assert the defense of "retaliatory eviction."9
The opinion of the court gave -the tenant's constitutional argument little
consideration, although several authors have contended that such a con-
stitutional argument has merit.10 No doubt the constitutional argument
1See WIs. STAT. § 234.03 (1967), and Dickhut v. Norton, 45 Wis. 2d 389, 400,
173 N.W.2d 397 (1970).
2 Wis STAT. § 234.03 (1967).
3 Schoshinksi, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposal for Change, 54 GEo.
L. J. 519, 541-542 (1966).4 Dickhut v. Norton, 45 Wis. 2d 389, 173 N.W.2d 297 (1970).
5 Id. at 399, 173 N.W.2d at 302.
6 WIs. STAT. § 66.435 (1967).
7 Vol. 1 MILWAUKEE CODE OF ORDINANCES § 75 (19).
845 Wis. 2d at 395, 173 N.W.2d at 299 (1970).
9 Id. at 397, 173 N.W.2d at 301.
10 See Traver v. G. and C. Construction Corp., Civil No. 64-2945 (S.D. N.Y.,
Nov. 9, 1964), discussed in 36 Gzo. WASH. L. Rzv. 190, 192 n. 19 (1967);
Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016
(1969); Potvin, Landlord-Tenant-Eviction in Retaliation for Reporting
Housing Code Violations Prohibited, 44 NoTE DAmE L. REv. 286 (1968) ; and
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would be important in jurisdictions which have not expressed a clear
legislative policy in the area of urban planning and renewal. For this
reason a discussion of the constitutional arguments is in order.
As expressed in the District of Columbia case of Edwards v. Ha-
bib,"' the constitutional bases for barring retaliatory evictions stem
from the theory that state court sanction of such evictions abridges a
tenant's First Amendment right to petition the government for a redress
of grievances. 12 However, before a tenant can prevail on .this theory he
must show that the government, including the judiciary, is in some
sense responsible for inhibiting the right to petition for the redress of
grievances. In other words, the tenant must establish the requisite
''state action."
In the Edwards case Judge Wright premised his discussion of the
above constitutional argument on three United States Supreme Court
decisions which considered the concept of state judicial action.13 One
of them, Shelley v. Kraemer, held that judicial enforcement of a private
agreement containing racially restrictive covenants constituted "state
action." Hence, Judge Wright said:
There can now be no doubt that the application by the judiciary
of .the state's common law, even in a lawsuit between private par-
ties, may constitute state action which must conform to the con-
stitutional strictures which constrain the government.
14
Judge Wright seemed to have no doubt that the eviction in Edwards
could not be sustained were he to decide -the constitutional issue, because
the government had, through its court, aided the landlord and failed to
protect the tenant from recrimination for exercising her First Amend-
ment right to petition the government for a redress of grievances. 5
Case Note, Landlord-Tenant-Eviction of Tenant Disallowed When In Retali-
ation for Tenant's Report of Housing Code Violations to Authorities, 1 Univ.
of Toledo L. Rev. 269 (1969).
11397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied 393 U.S. 1016 (1969).
12 U.S. CONsT. amend. I has been construed to include the right to report viola-
tions of law. In re Quarles and Butler, 158 U.S. 532, 537 (1895); United
States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
13 The cases relied on were: Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); New York
Times Company v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); and Marsh v. Alabama,
326 U.S. 501 (1946).
14 397 F.2d at 691. It has been established that a deprivation of Constitutional
rights, arising from specific amendments to the Constitution, is not confined
to direct action on the part of the state but extends to the "pretense" of
action under the authority of the state so that the action is "clothed" by the
state's authority. Screws v. United States, 140 F.2d 662, 665 (5th Cir. 1944),
reversed on other grounds, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) ; Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
(1961). While the Supreme Court of the United States "has never attempted
the 'impossible task' of formulating an infallible test for determining whether
the state 'in any of its manifestations' has become signicantly involved in
private discriminations, '(o)nly by sifting facts and weighing circumstances'
on a case-by-case basis can a 'non-obvious involvement of the state . . . be
attributed its true significance.'" Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 376, 378 (1967).
15 397 F.2d at 695.
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As stated above, the Wisconsin Supreme Court did not decide the
constitutional questions raised in Dickhut v. Norton.16 The court
found that the legislative public policy of Wisconsin permits the
defense of "retaliatory eviction" to be raised in unlawful detainer ac-
tions. The legislative public policy mentioned by the court is derived
from the urban renewal acts of the state legislature and the Milwau-
kee Common Council. The acts clearly recognize that blighted, sub-
standard and unsanitary housing conditions do exist and are detrimental
to the public interest. The acts contemplate the enactment of housing
regulations by municipalities to impose certain duties on property own-
ers concerning the maintenance of their premises. In its housing code,
the City of Milwaukee declared that:
the elimination of blighted premises and the prevention of occur-
rence of blighted premises in the future is in the best interest of
the citizens of this city, of the State of Wisconsin, and of the
entire United States; . . . (T)he enactment of this ordinance
is hereby declared to be essential to the public interest and it is
intended that this ordinance be liberally construed.'7
The Supreme Court took cognizance of the legislative policy in the area
of urban renewal and held that housing code violations were intended
to be reported by tenant's who were aware of the violations.' s Upon
this premise the court concluded that retaliatory eviction of tenants
who reported code violations was contrary to the expressed legislative
intent. In an effort to remedy this situation, the court stated:
16 This is in accord with established judicial decision-making which encourages
non-constitutional decisions whenever possible. However, the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court expressed some reservations as to whether the facts and factors
of the Dickhut action brought it within the constitutional concepts proposed by
the defendant. For arguments to the contrary see materials cited at note 10
supra.
17 1 MILWAUKEE CoDn OF O INANcEs § 75-(19).is In support of its recognition of the legislative policy in the area of urban
blight and housing code regulations the court cites language from two cases.
The court noted that in Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 595-596, 111 N.W.2d
409 (1961), it had taken cognizance of this policy prior to the Dickhut case
when it stated:
To follow the old rule of no implied warranty of habitability in leases
would, in our opinion, be inconsistent with the current legislative policy
concerning housing standards. The need and social desirability of ade-
quate housing for people in this era of rapid population increases is too
important to be rebuffed by that obnoxious legal cliche, caveat emptor.
Permitting landlords to rent "tumble down" houses is at least a con-
tributing cause of such problems as urban blight, juvenile delinquency,
and high property taxes for conscientious landowners.
The court noted the following language of the Edwards decision, supra note
11, at 701-702:
In light of the appalling condition and shortage of housing in Washing-
ton, the expense of moving, the inequality of bargaining power between
tenant and landlord, and the social and economic importance of assuming
at least minimum standards in housing conditions, we do not hesitate to
declare that retaliatory eviction cannot be tolerated. There can be no
doubt that the slum dweller, even though his home be marred by hous-
ing code violations, will pause long before he complains of them if he
fears eviction as a consequence.
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A landlord may terminate a tenancy at will or from month-to-
month (or lesser periods) for any legitimate reason or no reason
at all, but he cannot terminate such tenancy simply because his
tenant has reported an actual housing code violate as a means of
retaliation.19
Creation of the "retaliatory eviction" defense may effectively pre-
vent such evictions from occurring in Wisconsin. Under Dickhut v.
Norton a tenant can avoid a summary eviction if he can convince the
trier of fact that a condition existed on the premises which in fact vio-
lated the housing code; that the landlord knew the tenant reported the
condition to the authorities; and the landlord evicted the tenant with
the "sole" motive of retaliation. The tenant should be able to prove the
first element by introducing housing authority records which confirm
the violation. The second element can be proven by the housing authori-
ty records showing that the landlord was notified of the violations. If
such notification by the authority to the landlord does not name the
complainant then the tenant may be able to raise an inference of knowl-
edge on the landlord's part by introducing facts surrounding the housing
authority's investigation. For example, if the investigation took place
immediately prior to receipt of an eviction notice, the inference of
knowledge may be difficult for the landlord to overcome. Similarly, the
third element involving the "sole" motive may also be satisfied by dem-
onstrating the proximity in time between the tenant's report of the
violations and the receipt of an eviction notice. The tenant would neces-
sarily have to show that he had duly performed his obligations as a
tenant and that there was no other reason for which a landlord, in the
ordinary course of his business, would evict him.
The Dickhut decision, by providing a judicial answer to the problem
of retaliatory eviction, has raised some interesting questions concerning
the effect of this defense on landlord-tenant law in Wisconsin. For ex-
ample, if a tenant establishes and thereby successfully defends an un-
lawful detainer action, for how long may the tenant remain in posses-
sion before the landlord has a right to terminate the tenancy for any
reason or no reason as the statute provides? In other words, how long
does the defense of "retaliatory eviction" protect -the tenant from being
evicted? Although a landlord may evict for no reason at all he may not
be able to overcome the previous finding of illegal motive, unless he
can show a legitimate affirmative reason for the subsequent eviction.2"
What would be a legitimate affirmative reason under Wisconsin law?
Perhaps, evidence of a tenant's willfull or negligent conduct would be
sufficient to show a legitimate reason for the eviction. Eviction of a ten-
ant who harasses the landlord with numerous unreasonable demands
19 45 Wis. 2d at 399, 173 N.W.2d at 301-302 (1970).
20 Edwards v. Habib, supra note 11, at 702, footnote 53.
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may also be legitimate. Certainly a breach of the lease obligations by
the tenant would provide adequate reason for eviction. In any event, the
Dickhut decision appears to restrict the right of a landlord to terminate
a tenancy at will or from month-to-month for no reason at all. One can
infer from the Dickhut decision that once a sole motive of retaliation
has been judicially determined, a subsequent eviction by the landlord
must be for a legitimate reason. It seems logical to require landlords
to prove legitimate motive for eviction in unlawful detainer actions
when the defendant has successfully raised the defence of "retaliatory
eviction" in a prior action.21 Such a requirement would be consistent
with the policy of discouraging landlords from intimidating tenants who
report housing code violations.
A final question concerns other action by the landlord. For example,
will the judiciary recognize retaliatory rent increases as a valid defense
to an unlawful detainer action brought for failure to pay the increased
rent? Clearly, rent increases are another means by which a landlord
could intimidate tenants who try to better their housing conditions by
reporting violations as such, they should be declared inconsistent with
the policy of housing codes.2 2 Consistent with this reasoning, a landlord
desiring to raise a tenant's rent, under circumstances where a retalia-
tory motive could be presumed, may have to produce records to prove
that the increase was an economic necessity and not a means of retalia-
tion against the tenant.23
The "retaliatory eviction" defense will not remedy all of Wiscon-
sin's housing problems, but the Wisconsin Supreme Court is to be
applauded for its decision for several reasons. First, Wisconsin has now
affirmed its position, initially taken in Pines v. Perssion,24 among a
progressive minority of states which no longer are satisfied with
anachronistic, landlord oriented landlord-tenant laws.22 Secondly, while
21Id.; Dickhut v. Norton, supra 4, at 399-400.
22When considering what additional actions or defenses tenants may be allowed
due to the policy recognized in Pines and Dickhut, a subsequent decision af-
fecting Wisconsin's landlord-tenant law must be mentioned. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court in Posanski v. Hood, 46 Wis. 2d 172, 174 N.W.2d 528 (1979),
unanimously rejected a tenants contention that he had a right to withhold rent
because the landlord had violated the "covenants" contained in the Milwaukee
Housing Code. The court declared that the Milwaukee Housing Code does not
constitute an implied covenant to lease agreements, because the public policy
set forth in the housing code is clearly to be implemented through administra-
tive actions and not through the judiciary. The court made it clear that a
tenant's only remedy is through the housing authority with judicial protection
against landlord's retaliatory actions.
23See Traver v. G. and C. Construction Corp., supra note 10, discussed in Potvin,
Landlord-Tenant-Eviction in Retaliation for Reporting Housing Code Viola-
tions Prohibited, 44 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 286, 293. note 49, (1968).
2414 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
25 For survey discussion of just how lessor oriented American landlord-tenant
is see generally MacBain, Tenants Rights, LEGAL COUNSELING FOR THE INDIGENT
§ 5 (1968); Shoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant; Proposal for
Change, 54 GEo. L. 3. 519 (1966).
19711
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legislative action may be necessary for equitable solutions to the numer-
ous problems confronting landlords and tenants, the Dickhut decision
properly places the burden of awaiting legislative change upon the
landlord who violates the housing code, rather than upon the tenant
who wants to report such violations. Finally, the Dickhut decision gives
tenants a needed psychological victory. Ultimately, any rehabilitation
of slum areas is inextricably tied up with the attitudes of the slum
dwellers. If the indigent tenants do not believe that -their efforts at
self-improvement will meet with some success then most legislative
remedial action will be in vain.
DURANT S. ABERNETHY III
